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INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE
other nations already had prohibited this 
  technique. While in the aftermath of the 
approval of chlorpromazine as first medi-
cament  for  the  treatment  of  psychiatric 
diseases  in  1954  psychopharmacological 
therapy progressively began to revolution-
ize the psychiatric world, surgical methods 
for  the  treatment  of  psychiatric  diseases 
involving  gross  damage  of  brain  tissue 
were  abandoned.  However,  encouraged 
by former success with invasive methods 
and  supported  by  a  growing  knowledge 
regarding  neuroanatomy  and  neural  cir-
cuits underlying psychiatric and neurologi-
cal diseases, novel and innovative surgical 
techniques came up. By now the somewhat 
prestressed term “psychosurgery” gave way 
to the broader idea of “neuromodulation,” 
which summarizes not only invasive meth-
ods like deep brain stimulation (DBS) and 
vagus  nerve  stimulation,  but  also  non-
invasive  techniques  such  as  transcranial 
magnetic stimulation.
The ambivalent history of psychosurgery 
in mind, it is utterly comprehensible that 
even a reversible though (minimally) inva-
sive technique like DBS reactivates ancient 
fears. Furthermore, with the observation 
of psychiatric side effects following DBS 
of the subthalamic nucleus in patients suf-
fering from Parkinson’s disease in the late 
1990s (Bejjani et al., 1999; Hariz et al., 2010; 
Kuhn et al., 2010) psychiatric diseases came 
in the focus of DBS. Particularly since this 
amelioration of possible indications of DBS, 
the  to  some  extent  disreputable  inherit-
ance of psychosurgery has been brought 
up frequently.
However, DBS has not only proven to be 
an effective tool for the therapy of move-
ment  disorders  such  as  Parkinson’s  dis-
ease, essential tremor, and dystonia, but it 
also has been successfully applied for the 
treatment of various psychiatric disorders 
such  as  obsessive-compulsion  disorder 
(OCD),  depression,  Gilles-de-la-Tourette 
Syndrome, alcoholism, minimal conscious 
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The story of psychosurgery is one of great 
visions, groundbreaking ideas, and heroic 
acts; similarly it is a story of a great rise, a 
deep fall, and a cautious resurrection. For 
a long time, psychosurgery mainly had an 
experimental character and was dominated 
by anecdotal reports. In the aftermath of 
Fulton and Jabobsen’s presentation of their 
results of a series of neurosurgical experi-
ments  performed  with  primates  (Kopell 
and Rezai, 2003) during the International 
Neurological Congress in London in 1935, 
a considerable amount of ethically as well as 
scientifically doubtful surgical interventions 
were carried out in humans, occasionally 
even by medically uneducated personnel 
(Feldman  and  Goodrich,  2001).  In  this 
context one might paradigmatically men-
tion prefrontal lobotomies, which virtually 
were advertised as magic bullet for all sorts 
of psychiatric diseases mainly in the 1940s 
and 1950s (Feldman et al., 2001; Kopell and 
Rezai, 2003; Mashour et al., 2005). Issues of 
informed consent frequently were neglected 
(Feldman  and  Goodrich,  2001;  Pippard, 
2001; Huys et al., 2010), critical side effects 
of the operation were concealed in many 
cases (Feldman and Goodrich, 2001) and 
the procedure even was offered to patients 
considered as criminally insane in exchange 
for their freedom (Lowinger, 1987). It was 
not long after Egas Moniz shared the Nobel 
Prize for medicine “for his discovery of the 
therapeutic value of prefrontal leucotomies 
in certain psychoses” in 1949 (Anonymous, 
1949) when the public opinion of psycho-
surgery changed and questionable practices 
were unmasked (Heller et al., 2006).
Prompted by growing public criticism, a 
lack of a sufficient theoretical foundation, 
the  uncertainty  of  its  therapeutic  value 
and  severe  side  effects,  the  Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (Public 
Health  Service)  released  strict  restric-
tions regarding the usage of leucotomy in 
1978 (Department of Health, Education, 
and  Welfare,  1978);  back  then,  many 
states, and Alzheimer’s dementia. (Freund 
et al., 2009; Kuhn et al., 2010; Laxton et al., 
2010).
A considerable amount of ethical skepti-
cism culminates in the question of whether 
and how patients suffering from occasion-
ally  debilitating  psychiatric  diseases  are 
capable  of  giving  fully  and  freely  their 
informed consent to a partly experimental 
procedure like DBS; we use the term “exper-
imental” with precaution, but it should be 
kept in mind that there still is a considerable 
need for further research especially on its 
long-term therapeutic value with respect to 
its usage in psychiatric disorders (Hall and 
Carter, 2011).
Particularly  patients  with  Alzheimer’s 
disease may be limited in certain cogni-
tive dimensions and this restriction could 
endanger their ability to completely under-
stand all the implications connected with 
DBS. Beyond that, cognitive impairment is 
a common finding in patients with depres-
sion which could be linked to a dysfunc-
tion of the prefrontal cortex in interaction 
with subcortical regions (Clark et al., 2009); 
this dysfunction may result in deficits of 
attention, perception, concentration, and 
memory,  hereby  leading  to  a  significant 
ambivalence  of  the  patient.  Moreover, 
patients suffering from substance abuse fre-
quently are impaired with respect to tasks 
that involve highly goal-directed behavior; 
just recently it has been hypothesized that 
this deficit may be a result of a dysfunctional 
hypocretin system in the lateral thalamus 
(Boutrel et al., 2010). Due to this psychi-
atric  condition,  these  patients  might  be 
constricted in their free decision making 
process.
Furthermore, many questions regarding 
DBS are still unanswered yet, for which rea-
son it frequently is considered as a last resort 
when  other  therapeutic  strategies  could 
not be of substantial help. In this situation 
the desperate hope for ultimate relief may 
unduly affect a patient’s ability to give his 
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  existing prejudice of the patient or his or 
her   relatives, urgently call for detailed ethi-
cal examinations, highly skilled physicians, 
and  more  specific  instruments  for  the 
assessment of a patient’s capacity.
The MacArthur Competence Assessment 
Tool-Treatment  (MacCAT-T)  currently 
is regarded as psychiatry’s gold standard 
for the determination of a patient’s deci-
sion making competence. However, it has 
been reasonably criticized: the underlying 
construct of “competence” evaluated by the 
MacCAT-T is dominated by cognitive cri-
teria, whereas emotional and biographical 
factors and a patient’s values are ignored, 
although these dimensions might be of sub-
stantial importance during a decision mak-
ing process (Breden and Vollmann, 2004). 
No alternative tool has been developed so 
far, so there is a high and urgent need for 
further endeavor in the design of proper 
assessment tools, which should include an 
extension of the cognition-based construct 
of competence proposed by the MacCAT-T.
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or her consent (Glannon, 2010): this aspect 
exemplarily is emphasized by the fact that 
OCD patients have to suffer up to 8 h a day 
from typical symptoms of their disease to 
be accepted as possible candidates for DBS 
(Glannon, 2010). Additionally, the media’s 
perception  of  DBS  and  its  therapeutic 
potential tend to be euphoric and occasion-
ally too optimistic. Contrariwise, psycho-
surgery’s frightful history not infrequently 
is picked out as the central theme of novels 
and movies (cp. “One Flew Over the Cocoo’s 
Nest,” 1975 or “Shutter Island,” 2010), which 
might be a source of inadequate fright for 
patients and their family members.
We go along with Lang and Widner’s 
(2002)  suggestion  that  “surgery  should 
never be offered to a patient until … [a] 
realistic understanding is fully established.” 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001) and Berg 
et al. (2001) found that informed consent 
implies three basic requests: (1) all medi-
cally relevant information about diagnosis 
and  prognosis  of  a  patient’s  disease,  the 
therapy, its potential risks and alternative 
therapies must be disclosed. (2) The patient 
should have the mental capacity to under-
stand his or her situation and the presented 
information. (3) The patient must not be 
coerced or compelled, but autonomously 
decides about a treatment on the basis of 
the information disclosed. Regarding what 
has been discussed above, a patient and his 
or her family members might be prejudiced 
and influenced in many ways considering 
DBS. In addition, due to the underlying 
psychiatric disease, the patient might lack 
the mental capacity to fully comprehend his 
or her condition. Considering all this, envis-
aging DBS bears the risk that a patient’s 
autonomy, i.e., his or her capacity to deter-
mine freely what action should be taken, if 
any, might be endangered. The concept of 
autonomy is closely connected to personal 
uniqueness (Breden and Vollmann, 2004) 
– so what if this uniqueness is affected by 
disease and possibly by prejudice as well? 
Even though this challenge is not unique 
to DBS or even to DBS in psychiatric dis-
eases, the specific history of DBS, the com-
plex  connotations  of  a  patient  suffering 
from a psychiatric illness and potentially 
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